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Daniel Wertz, Program 
Manager at the 
NaƟonal CommiƩee on 
North Korea, explains 
that “AŌer the world re
‐emerges from 
lockdowns and 
quaranƟnes to combat 
the COVID‐19 
pandemic, Pyongyang 
may find that its circle 
of old friends and 
business partners has 
goƩen smaller.” 
North Korea’s tumultuous path over the past few years from nuclear standoff to summit diplomacy 
put a spotlight on Pyongyang’s bilateral relaƟons across the Indo‐Pacific. The February 2017 
assassinaƟon of Kim Jong Un’s exiled half‐brother at the Kuala Lumpur airport dramaƟzed the malign 
aspects of North Korea’s overseas presence, and presaged Southeast Asia’s role as an important 
front in the incipient U.S.‐led maximum pressure campaign against Pyongyang. As maximum 
pressure transiƟoned to engagement with North Korea, U.S.‐DPRK summits in Singapore and 
Vietnam raised hopes that North Korea could follow the examples of these host naƟons, and move 
forward on a more hopeful path toward economic development and reconciliaƟon with old 
adversaries. 
Both the rhetoric of maximum pressure and expectaƟons about the arrival of peace and prosperity 
north of the 38th parallel have dissipated over the past year. However, UN sancƟons have remained 
in place, and – seƫng aside China and Russia – most countries in the Indo‐Pacific have recently 
shown some degree of seriousness about enforcing them. AŌer the world re‐emerges from 
lockdowns and quaranƟnes to combat the COVID‐19 pandemic, Pyongyang may find that its circle of 
old friends and business partners has goƩen smaller, and that its economic dependence on China 
has only deepened. 
Cambodia’s acƟons to enforce UN sancƟons have been parƟcularly notable, given the country’s close 
historical relaƟonship with North Korea and its general alignment with Beijing on foreign policy 
maƩers. In January 2020, Cambodia reported to the UN’s 1718 CommiƩee that it had deregistered a 
dozen North Korean business enƟƟes in the country, expelled 115 North Korean workers, and shut 
down the North Korean restaurants in its territory as well as a prominent North Korean‐built 
museum in Siem Reap. In early March, Phnom Penh also seized an oil tanker suspected of illicitly 
smuggling fuel to North Korea, echoing Indonesia’s seizure (and eventual forfeiture to U.S. custody) 
of the coal smuggling ship Wise Honest two years earlier. 
Along with Cambodia, other countries in the Indo‐Pacific appear to have taken UN Security Council 
ResoluƟon 2397’s December 2019 deadline for the expulsion of North Korean overseas workers to 
heart. China and Russia – the two countries that have hosted the vast majority of such workers – 
have reportedly allowed significant numbers of North Korean workers to remain in or re‐enter their 
territory on alternaƟve types of visas, despite paying lip service to UN sancƟons. However, the 
ASEAN countries all report that no DPRK naƟonals remain working in their territory. Mongolia, which 
has worked to posiƟon itself as a mediator on Korean Peninsula security issues, began to expel the 
esƟmated 1,200 North Korean workers in its territory beginning in 2017. Thailand and Nepal have 
also deported small numbers of North Korean naƟonals working in their territory illegally. Further 
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afield in the Persian Gulf, where an esƟmated 8,000 or more North Korean laborers were based prior 
to 2017, the countries which previously hosted these workers have all stated that they have ended 
the pracƟce. (Country‐by‐country summaries of the status of North Korean overseas workers are 
available at NorthKoreaInTheWorld.org, a joint project of the East‐West Center and the NaƟonal 
CommiƩee on North Korea.) 
Reported North Korean trade with Indo‐Pacific countries other than China has also fallen 
considerably since wide‐ranging UN sancƟons were imposed in 2017. (Reported North Korean 
exports to China have dropped precipitously, but Chinese exports of non‐sancƟoned goods to North 
Korea have remained steady.) India and Thailand, once North Korea’s largest foreign trade partners 
aŌer China and Russia, saw 2019 bilateral trade volumes with the DPRK drop to around $12 million 
and near‐zero respecƟvely. The Philippines and Singapore – also among North Korea’s top non‐
Chinese partners for reported bilateral trade in past years, exporƟng goods such as tobacco and 
electronics to the DPRK – both unilaterally banned trade with North Korea in 2017.  
Singapore, which has historically been something of a hub for North Korean commercial and 
sancƟons evasion acƟviƟes due to its business‐friendly climate, has also taken recent acƟons to 
prosecute sancƟons violators. Last November, a Singaporean businessman was sentenced to 34 
months in jail for exporƟng luxury goods to North Korean department stores and for money 
laundering. In August last year, Singapore charged a different company with illegally shipping alcohol 
to North Korea via the Chinese port of Dalian; Malaysia subsequently arrested a North Korean 
naƟonal linked to the scheme, with a court approving his extradiƟon to the U.S. on money 
laundering charges. A third series of Singaporean prosecuƟons for violaƟons of sancƟons against 
North Korea is apparently pending.  
The Ɵghtening sancƟons enforcement noose by Southeast Asian countries and beyond is reducing 
North Korea’s space for external engagement. However, North Korea’s need to culƟvate such illicit 
mulƟnaƟonal networks and to maintain a variety of friendly diplomaƟc Ɵes abroad may also be 
diminishing, at least for the near term. As the latest UN Panel of Experts reports demonstrates, 
North Korean smuggling to and from Chinese ports is becoming increasingly open and flagrant; with 
such an enabling environment in its immediate vicinity, there is less need for North Korea to engage 
in elaborate decepƟon schemes involving third countries far from its borders. North Korea is also 
apparently no longer reliant on overseas venues to host its army of cyber warriors: according to the 
Panel of Experts, most of the country’s malicious cyber acƟviƟes are now conducted from within its 
borders, even as North Korea conƟnues to send IT specialists abroad for more mundane freelance 
work to earn foreign exchange. 
North Korea has long culƟvated relaƟons in the developing world to avoid becoming overly 
dependent on its great power patrons, including China. Many of these relaƟonships were forged in 
the era of post‐colonial struggles and the Cold War, and they have conƟnued in various shapes and 
forms in the decades since. But as North Korea conƟnues to turn inward and the reality of an 
expansive and indefinite sancƟons regime begins to seƩle in, Pyongyang might find that it has finally 
worn out the welcome of some of its old friends and partners. 
"North Korea’s need 
to culƟvate illicit 
mulƟnaƟonal 
networks and to 
maintain a variety of 
friendly diplomaƟc 
Ɵes abroad may be 
diminishing.” 
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